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State Appellate Public Defender
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AARON J. CURRIN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9718
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
ANDREW GARLOCK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44606
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2016-8334

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Andrew Garlock timely appeals following his guilty plea and conviction for battery
with the intent to commit a serious felony and two counts of penetration by foreign
object. Following his plea, Mr. Garlock was sentenced to an aggregate unified sentence
of life in prison, with fifteen (15) years fixed. He asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist
in this case.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On June 27, 2016, Boise Police were dispatched to a call about a prowler. (PSI,
p.3.) At the scene, they met S.G. who told police she was alone in the house when she
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was awoken to an unknown male standing over her in her bedroom, trying to remove
her clothing. (PSI, p.3.) During the struggle, which lasted between 15-30 minutes, she
was choked, punched in the face and had her head slammed against the wall. (PSI,
p.3.) Moreover, she told police the male put his mouth on her right nipple and
penetrated her vagina and anus with gloved fingers. (PSI, p.3.) He attempted to remove
his pants but was unsuccessful because she fought him off. (PSI, p.3.) After he left, she
contacted the police. (PSI, p.3.) Upon their arrival, she gave the police a description of
his clothing and his hair, which she described as mid length. (PSI, p.3.) She told police
he smelled dirty and was almost as heavy as her brother’s friend, Andrew Garlock. (PSI,
p.3.)
Mr. Garlock was arrested and agreed to speak to the police. (PSI, p.3.) In his
statement, he confirmed that most of what S.G. told the police, is what happened. (PSI,
pp.3-4.) He wrote an apology letter to S.G., telling her that he was sorry for entering the
house with the intention of molesting her. (PSI, p.4.)
On July 12, 2016, an Ada County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Garlock on five felony
counts: Count One: Battery with the Intent to Commit a Serious Felony, I.C. section 18903, 18-911; Count Two and Three: Penetration by Foreign Object, I.C. section 186608; Count Four: Kidnapping in the First Degree, I.C. section 18-4501, 4502; Count
Five: Burglary, I.C. section 18-1401. (R., pp.40-41.) On July 19, 2016, Mr. Garlock
entered a not guilty plea to all counts. (R., p.47-48.) On August 18, 2016, Mr. Garlock
pled guilty to Counts One, Two and Three. (R., p.54.) The State dismissed Counts Four
and Five. (R., p.54.) In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to request that the
court sentence Mr. Garlock to fifteen years on the fixed portion of the sentence, to run
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concurrently, but the State was free to argue the indeterminate portion. (Tr., p.13, L.4 –
p.14, L.6.) Moreover, Mr. Garlock was free to argue for a more lenient sentence at
sentencing. (Tr., p.14, Ls.7-8.) On October 11, 2016, Mr. Garlock was sentenced.
Mr. Garlock asked that the fixed portion of his sentence be two (2) or three (3) years
and his indeterminate sentence be fifteen (15) to twenty (20) years. (Tr., p.44, Ls.1-4.)
Mr. Garlock was sentenced to a unified sentence of life in prison on Count Three and 20
years on Counts One and Two with fifteen (15) years fixed on all counts to run
concurrently along with a $5,000 civil fine and fees. (R., pp.69-73.) On November 3,
2016, Mr. Garlock filed a Rule 35 motion asking the district court for leniency on his
sentence. (R., p.75.) On December 29th, 2016, the district court denied Mr. Garlock’s
Rule 35 motion.1 (R., p.86-87.) Mr. Garlock timely appealed.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of life in
prison on Count Three and 20 years on Counts One and Two, with fifteen (15) years
fixed on all counts, to run concurrently, upon Mr. Garlock following his plea of guilty to
two counts of Penetration by Foreign Object and one count of Battery with the Intent to
Commit a Serious Felony?

1

Mr. Garlock does not raise the denial of his Rule 35 motion because he failed to
supply new or additional information as is required under State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho
201, 203 (2007).
3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Life In
Prison On Count Three And 20 Years On Counts One And Two, With Fifteen (15) Years
Fixed On All Counts, To Run Concurrently Upon Mr. Garlock Following His Plea Of
Guilty To Two Counts Of Penetration By Foreign Object And One Count Of Battery With
The Intent To Commit A Serious Felony
Mr. Garlock asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate unified
sentence of life in prison, with fifteen (15) years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Garlock does not allege that his
sentences exceed the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Garlock must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentences
were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136
Idaho 138 (2001)). Mr. Garlock asserts that the district court did not sufficiently consider
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his youth, mental health issues, family support, remorse and regret, and amenability to
sex offender treatment.
The United States Supreme Court and The Idaho Supreme Court have always
determined that a defendant’s youth should be considered as a mitigating factor when
determining an appropriate sentence. Beginning with Dunnagan, Idaho Courts have
viewed youth as a mitigating consideration for sentencing. State v. Dunnagan, 101
Idaho 125, 126 (1980) (holding that 28-year aggregate sentences for a series of thefts
and theft-related burglaries were excessive for co-defendants who were 20 and 21
years old, and who had “very low” IQ scores); State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 224
(1985) (“The sentencing judge found several mitigating factors, including Caudill’s
youthful age, prior nonviolent nature, lack of prior criminal record, potential for
rehabilitation, and remorse.”). More recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined
that an aggregate fixed portion of the sentences of twenty-eight (28) years “is longer
than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.” State v. Justice, 152 Idaho 48,
55 (Ct. App. 2011). In Justice the court took his youth and his possibility for
rehabilitation into consideration reasoning “we note that any programs of rehabilitation
available to Justice in prison will certainly be completed in significantly less than twentyeight years.” Justice, 152 Idaho at 54.
The United States Supreme Court has treated juveniles differently than adults
stating that juveniles “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). Roper reasons “as any parent knows and
as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm,
‘[a] lack of maturity and an undeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more
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often than in adults and are more understanding among the young.” Roper, 543 U.S. at
569. Although Roper held juveniles were ineligible for the death penalty, the United
States Supreme Court later determined, as a matter of substantive law, to prohibit
juveniles from receiving a mandatory life sentence without parole. Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 732 (2016). Mr. Garlock was only eighteen at the commission
of this crime. Therefore, he was not a juvenile, nor was he charged with a crime that
carried a potential death penalty sentence. However, implicit in both of these cases is
the basic premise, recognized by Idaho courts, two decades before Roper and
Montgomery, was the acknowledgement that “children have a lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity and
heedless risk taking.” Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 733. At sentencing the district court
mentioned Mr. Garlock’s youth. (Tr., p.49, Ls.1-15.) However, Mr. Garlock asserts for
the reasons discussed supra, the district court did not sufficiently consider his youth
when Mr. Garlock was sentenced to an aggregate unified life sentence.
Idaho courts have long recognized a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing
factor that should be considered by the court. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391
(1994) (“Idaho Code section 19-2523, which requires that the trial court consider the
defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an integral part of the
legislature’s repeal of mental condition as a defense.”); Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573,
581 (1999) (“Hollon correctly states that if mental condition is a significant factor, the
court must consider the factors listed in I.C. section 19-2523.”). These factors address
all aspects of mental illness, from diagnosis, availability of treatment, prognosis for
improvement/rehabilitation, risk of danger to the public and the defendant’s ability to
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appreciate the criminality of their conduct at the time of the offense. I.C. section 192523(1)(a-f). “Idaho Code section 19-2523 uses mandatory language of ‘shall’ and we
have previously stated that I.C. section 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider the
defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor.” Odiaga, 125 Idaho at 391.
In January, 2015, Mr. Garlock reported he was diagnosed with depression and
was prescribed Wellbutrin after he attempted suicide by tying a rope around his neck
and pulling on it. (PSI, p.11.) According to Mr. Garlock, he was seeing Melissa (LNU)
once a week for about three months to discuss his depression. (PSI, pp.11-12.)
Mr. Garlock also “disclosed a family history of depression, a brother who was autistic
and understood his mother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder.” (PSI, p.12.)
Idaho courts have recognized family support as a mitigating sentencing factor.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter
alia, had the support of his family and his employer); State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293
(Ct. App. 1991) (treating the fact that the defendant “had considerable family support
and was well liked by his friends” as mitigating, but nevertheless affirming his
concurrent fifteen years sentences for two counts of delivery of heroin).
Mr. Garlock reports that he is close to his mother and last spoke to his biological
father by phone in April 2016. (PSI, p.7.) He also enjoys a close relationship with his
step-siblings and his grandparents. (PSI, p.7.) In particular, he enjoyed spending time
with his grandfather working on his scale trains, even becoming a regular member of
the Train Club, helping set up the train sets at the Idaho Botanical Gardens. (PSI, p.9.)
In Idaho, a defendant’s remorse and regret for his/her conduct is a basis for
giving a more lenient sentence. State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991)
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(holding that some leniency was required, in part, because the defendant expressed
“remorse for his conduct”); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Caudill,109 Idaho 222, 224 (1985) (“The sentencing judge found several mitigating
factors, including Caudill’s youthful age, prior nonviolent nature, lack of prior criminal
record, potential for rehabilitation, and remorse.”). In Mr. Garlock’s case, he has
expressed remorse and regret, on multiple occasions about what he did to S.G.,
acknowledging she has the potential to experience negative effects because of his
actions, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (PSI, p.37.) Mr. Garlock also
stated in his PSI that he “hate[s] what I did and don’t ever want to do it again.” (PSI,
p.37.) Mr. Garlock also expressed remorse at sentencing telling the court he was sorry
for what he had done and that he would do anything to take back what he did to S.G.
(Tr., p.45, Ls.12-25.)
Lastly, the Court failed to adequately consider Mr. Garlock’s amenability to sex
offender treatment, which Idaho courts have considered a mitigating factor to warrant a
reduced sentence. State v. Albert, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
consecutive sentences for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor were excessive, in
part, because the defendant expressed a “willingness to accept treatment”); State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 295-96 (1997) (finding a fixed-life sentence excessive, in part,
because the defendant had never had the opportunity for true sex offender treatment
and the psychological evaluator “indicated that the proper treatment could help Jackson
from re-offending”). During the interview to complete the PSI, Mr. Garlock stated “he
believed he could benefit from sexual offender treatment, and specifically indicated he
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would participate in sexual offender treatment if sexual offender treatment were
recommended.” (PSI, p.49.)
Had the district court properly considered all of these mitigating factors, it would
have found that the objective of criminal punishment could have been met by
sentencing Mr. Garlock to three (3) years fixed and twenty (20) years indeterminate. As
Mr. Garlock argued, a sentence such as this would have addressed the seriousness of
the offense, indicated by the twenty (20) year fixed sentence, while also taking into
account these mitigating factors, indicated by the three (3) years fixed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Garlock respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2017.

_________/s/________________
AARON J. CURRIN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of March, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
ANDREW GARLOCK
INMATE #121043
ISCI
PO BOX 14
BOISE ID 83707
RICHARD D GREENWOOD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
ERIC R ROLFSEN
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF

__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AJC/eas
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